Today's conversation is with Ken Wilcox, the former CEO of Silicon Valley Bank.
Ken's new book The China Business Conundrum: Ensure That "Win-Win" Doesn't Mean Western Companies Lose Twice is out now.
In the conversation, Ken shares his experience of navigating the complex, untold realities of doing business in China.
It's a compelling listen for any businessperson, consultant, or executive looking to do business with China and for the global citizen looking to get informed.
Episode Links
- Purchase "The China Business Conundrum" on Amazon
- Follow Ken Wilcox on LinkedIn
- Book a 15m call with Eden to go over recruitment support options
Transcription
Welcome to this special episode of Strategy Simplified. My name is Namaan. I'm the Chief Operating Officer of Management Consulted.
We are joined today by special guest, Ken Wilcox. And Ken really doesn't need much of an introduction, but for those of you who might not be familiar with his work and his career, I'm going to quickly give you just a little bit of background on Ken. Ken, our team wrote a lovely bio for you, so I'm going to read it out.
You can tell me what they got right, what they got wrong, and then we'll dive into our conversation today. So Ken Wilcox is the former CEO of Silicon Valley Bank, an institution recognized for supporting technology, life sciences, and the VC industries. He served as CEO from 2001 to 2010, during which time SVB expanded its influence globally, particularly by fostering relationships between Silicon Valley and international tech hubs.
In addition to his leadership at SVB, Ken is an advocate for innovation and entrepreneurship. He frequently speaks about the importance of collaboration between the US and other major markets. He remains active in business circles as a mentor and advisor, and his work reflects a deep interest in fostering international business relationships and understanding the cultural dynamics of global markets.
Ken has a new book coming out later this year. It's called the China Business Conundrum, Ensuring That Win-Win Doesn't Mean Western Companies Lose Twice. And it offers a revealing account of his experience as the former CEO of Silicon Valley Bank, navigating the complexities of doing business in China. Ken, welcome to Strategy Simplified.
Thank you very much. It's good to be here.
Where does this call find you today?
Oh, I'm right in my home office in San Francisco.
San Francisco. I love it. Well, let's dive right in. So today's conversation is really focused on the challenges and complexities for American companies doing business in China. And I'm wondering if you can kick us off by just providing the current state of play, what's happening in the Chinese economy.
There's been a lot of news reports lately about weakening, at least macroeconomically in China. I'm just wondering if you can provide us with some insight on what current state looks like.
Well, I will do my best. I'm not an economist. I'm a banker. But I can tell you because I have a lot of contacts in China and I attend events focusing on China virtually every week. Yes, it is true. The Chinese economy is veering downward.
I wouldn't say cratering, but veering downward. It's a very complex set of circumstances, however, and it would take more time than you have this morning to explain why. But I don't anticipate that it will be veering upward again anytime soon.
On the other hand, I'm not one of those people who predicts a collapse because the Chinese Communist Party has done a remarkable job over the decades of countering forces that are threatening its economy.
So it seems like the rate of growth is long in China, at least from its nadir when you were doing a lot of work in China earlier this century. And specifically, Ken, you were focused on setting up a joint venture between Silicon Valley Bank and Chinese partners. Can you talk to us about the parameters of that joint venture and what the work was that you were doing over in China?
Sure. So I would say that my primary focus during the time that I was CEO was taking the company global, which means that we were focused on all of the innovation centers in the world. First, Israel, then various innovation centers in Europe, then India, and finally China.
My team first started traveling on a regular basis to China in the year 2000. We set up our first office in China in the year 2005. And then when I retired from being CEO of Silicon Valley Bank, which was all planned and set up at advance, years in advance, I was just about ready to go home and entertain my grandchildren.
When we got word from Beijing, our board got word from Beijing, that they were very much interested in having us set up a joint venture technology bank in China. The board looked around and it turned out I was the only one who was really excited about going. Everybody was excited about having somebody go, but nobody really wanted to go with me and then another fellow came with me.
So Ken, what was it about the opportunity that drew you when others seemed to shy away?
Well, bear in mind, this was quite a while ago. This would have been in the 2010-2011 timeframe. Two things, really.
Number one is that we had been marching around China for already a decade at that point, meeting people, trying to find a sponsor, and assessing the innovation centers in China, of which there are several, actually. We believed, based on what we saw, that the innovation space in China was going to be very, very large in not that much time. That's number one.
And number two is, our whole philosophy of the way things work in this world. We believe at Silicon Valley Bank that innovation is one of the only true global industries. Meaning, you could have industries that are geographically limited or focused on a single country in various categories.
But when it comes to technology, if you're not cutting edge everywhere, you're not cutting edge anywhere. All of these different innovation centers around the globe interact with each other on a regular basis. So we felt it was important that we included China in our repertoire.
Ken, would you say that your thesis was proved out? The pace and the scale of innovation that you expected to see in China, is that what we saw play out over the coming years?
Well, that's my belief. That's my observation. In fact, in various categories, it's alleged at least or believed that China is pulled ahead of almost every other country, not across the board, but in certain key categories. And so, our job was to replicate Silicon Valley Bank, which, as you probably know, was focused exclusively on technology and venture capital, replicate Silicon Valley Bank in China.
And what role do you feel like SVB played in the creation and the acceleration of the innovation ecosystem in China?
Well, that's really hard to assess. And it's largely hard to assess because it was very difficult for us to do business in China. And fundamentally, other banks in China were copying us.
But copying us is not that easy because we don't have a model that's easily copied. I think that on the Chinese side, they initially believed, at least, that we had an algorithm or a series of algorithms that would enable us to differentiate between early stage technology companies that were going to be wildly successful and those that weren't. But in point of fact, we have no algorithm.
We have long apprenticeships and pattern recognition programs. But no algorithm. They were a little disappointed. I don't know if they're capable of copying us. But I would say there are a variety of reasons for that. It was a great experience.
Best four years or most interesting four years of my life. But at the same time, it was a very frustrating experience. And I'm not sure that either side got out of it what they had hoped.
So there's no silver or magic bullet to determining which early stage companies are going to be whopping successes. Can you talk to us a little bit around about the greatest challenges that you faced while you were in China? Obviously, folks trying to copycat your model. But beyond that or deeper than that, what were some of the specific challenges you faced and how did you mitigate those?
Well, I'm not sure we actually did mitigate them. But I can tell you what the challenges were. Challenges would fit probably in the three categories, or at least that's the way I'd describe that.
One of them would be the banking system in China is totally different than the one that we have here in the United States. And for that matter, the ones we worked within in other countries like the US, Israel, almost all European countries, even India, the Chinese banking system is different. And in particular, I'll point to one thing, there are a number of things, but one thing in particular is that Chinese banks never fail.
You know, we have several hundred banks fail, probably almost every year, because when I started in banking 40-some years ago, there were, I think, 18,000 banks in the US, and we're down to about 5,000 today. They fail because they make bad loans. But in China, when banks make bad loans, the Chinese Communist Party quietly recapitalizes them, makes all the bad loans and puts them in a landfill somewhere, and that's the end of it.
So that would be the one problem. But I'll list two others. The second one would be the Chinese negotiation style, which is not something that we were used to.
The negotiation style that we're used to is a sort of a win-win negotiation style. And I think that's prominent in Western countries. The Chinese negotiation style is all about leverage. You've got to have leverage and you've got to maintain your leverage. And that's a little different. It takes some getting used to.
And the third thing I would mention is the geopolitical aspect. Because actually, the original title for my book was One Bed, Two Dreams, which is a translation of a saying that's very common in China. And it explains why almost no joint ventures work, especially in China, because the dream is different.
Our dream was serving the technology industry globally and making money while doing it. Their dream, I'm convinced in retrospect, was simply copying us, having us more or less there right on site so that they could try at least to copy our methodology. We don't actually have technology.
We have an art of doing business. And I think the whole point in inviting us to come over was to copy us.
Do you feel like they've been successful in replicating the SVB model in-house?
I don't think so. But I think that they'll find other ways of solving the problem. One of the biggest differences between the two economies is that in the Western economies, to one degree or another, the market determines the outcome.
And in China, the government is in the business of picking winners and losers. And so I think that they'll continue that approach and they'll fund the companies that they think are winners, and less so the ones that they don't anticipate will be winners. And it's actually working for them, it seems.
Do you think that's a sustainable long-term strategy, Ken?
Well, I'd like to think that it isn't. But it's unclear to me at this point. They certainly have done a good job in certain verticals, in certain technologies.
I know, I've always believed that the heavy hand of government picking winners and losers is not the optimal way to structure a market. I've been brought up to believe that, you know, bank failures are a healthy part of a financial and a business life cycle. So if that is not the case in China, did that force SVB to change its operating or its business model to succeed in that kind of environment?
Well, to a degree, yes.
I'll answer the question this way. All of my years in business have been in the innovation ecosystem mostly here in the US. And as you're pointing to it yourself, one of the basic beliefs in the US in general, and in particular in the innovation ecosystems, is that the market should decide, government shouldn't.
I remember years ago attending a speech here in Silicon Valley given by a fellow who was the CEO of a semiconductor at the time. And the whole speech in front of hundreds of people, the theme was, don't go to Washington. That's a big waste of your time.
Stay right here in Silicon Valley. Talking to the government is never a good idea. Frankly, most Westerners, in particular Americans, I think, more than Europeans who go to China, arrive with that basic belief still intact.
And some of them never get over it. Some of them figure out over time that you've got to have a government relations function. As a matter of fact, whoever is the leader there, the CEO of the Overseas Operation, the Chinese operation, has to, on a regular ongoing basis, have contact with the government.
Otherwise, there is virtually no chance of success. So in that sense, there was an adjustment.
So if I am a leader inside of an American or a Western company planning to dramatically expand my operations in China, one of your big pieces of advice to me would be invest in government relations. Do you have a couple of other pieces of advice to share with someone in that kind of situation as well?
Oh yeah, absolutely. I've got a couple of other pieces of advice. That doesn't mean that I was successful in following my own advice, but it does mean that I learned something during, we were there for four years.
And then after that, I was still a part of the bank, but I was there only a few weeks every year, maybe six weeks every year. So it's a lot of experience, I would say, and a chance to learn a lot of things. So I'll mention at least two things.
One of them is adjusting to a system where the negotiations are all about leverage. And because the problem is, in China, they sometimes pretend to take an interest in contracts, probably in order to appease the Americans that are trying to gain a foothold and feel that a contract is an important thing. The truth is they don't pay any attention to contracts at all.
They develop a memoranda of understanding, which is, you talk to your business partner and develop a sense of what the other person is trying to accomplish and what you're trying to accomplish. That's step one, and step number two is you get going. And every day, I'm exaggerating to make a point, every day your business partner will wake up in the morning and reassess the relative leverage.
Who has more leverage, you or he or she? And if he thinks he has more leverage, he'll renegotiate whatever was yesterday's understanding in a way to your disadvantage. And if he thinks you have more leverage, he'll expect that you'll do the same to him and think you're stupid if you don't.
So, that was a gigantic, I would say, challenge. And another gigantic challenge, which is part and parcel of everything I'm saying, is that we all have what I call mental models that are based on our own experience. And we carry them over to China and superimpose them on what we see.
And it results in our misinterpreting what we see. I'll give you one example. We tend to think of state-owned versus private.
But, you know, those terms are in some sense meaningless when we go to China, because private means something totally different. And by our definition, all companies are to one degree or another state-owned. And some people never get over that.
If you can break through your mental models, in German, you would say, if you can jump over your own shadow, maybe you can figure it out, and it'll be to your benefit. It'll help you accomplish what you want to accomplish. But those challenges are gigantic.
They're far bigger than I would have ever imagined. And visiting China doesn't get you there. You have to live there.
You have to get into the trenches. You have to work with business partners, and you'll slowly figure it out if you're open-minded and if you're lucky, I would say.
Ken, that's really, really insightful. Bringing the right frame, the right lenses to view reality in that kind of environment is critical to success.
I'm curious from your experience, in a culture and an environment where negotiations are based on leverage or perceived leverage, and not necessarily with a win-win focus, what are some effective strategies for negotiating with Chinese counterparts, either if you're a business owner setting up a joint venture, or maybe even if you're at the State Department thinking about diplomacy with the Chinese?
How do you attack that?
I would say two different things, neither of which are that easy. The first thing I would say, I would say three different things, none of which are, or some of them are somewhat easy. One of them is get ahold of a book that was written in 1982 by MIT sinologist named Lucien Pai.
It's called Chinese Commercial Negotiations, and it describes the negotiation style. I read that book years ago, before I moved to China, and I thought Lucien Pai is the most cynical person I have ever read. I can't believe that this is true.
And sure enough, within the first year, I experienced every single thing that he described in the book. So, read Lucien Pai. That's a good starting point.
It's only 100 pages. The second thing is, don't be confused by some of the basic behavior patterns. So, for example, if you're negotiating with the Chinese Communist Party, which you fundamentally are, whether you realize it or not, you have to take into consideration that they have all the time in the world.
Americans are always, and I'm one of them, by God, always in a rush. We want to accomplish something. Get it done and get going.
And I thought negotiating with the CCP was like negotiating with my kids when they were five years old. They had all the time in the world. I was the one who had to go to work.
They didn't care. So I think you have to get used to a different mode. You have to get used to the fact that you will be, the art of negotiation in China is, in a sense, based on the philosophy of The Art of War, the book that was written, you know, well over a couple thousand years ago.
And the fundamental message of The Art of War is, it's better to win by deception than win by fighting, because fighting is painful and deception isn't. So you will be deceived. I wouldn't call it bull face lying.
I would say it's just a different style. And you will get fooled in the thinking things that aren't true. Get used to it.
Question everything. Understand that it all boils on a leverage. Understand the other party's leverage and yours.
And because everything is based on Quid pro Quo, make absolutely certain that they take the first step, not you. And secondly, that the second step, the one that you take, is very small, so that you're not giving away the store in a single step. And plan for the future, so that you're withholding a sufficient amount of what they want, so that you continue to have leverage as you, the two of you march forward and develop your relationship.
That is a very hard style to get used to. It takes a lot of clever thinking, in my opinion. So, that is what my answer is to your question, I think.
Maybe there's more.
Ken, really insightful. Speaking from the US perspective, I see a different economic model between the US and China. I see different definitions of what success looks like.
I see different definitions of what a negotiation really is, and what the outcome should look like. So, within this context, how do you see the future of US-China business relations evolving, especially keeping in mind that you can't divorce business relations from geopolitical tensions?
Right, and you can't. Make no mistake, you cannot. So, you know, there are three or four potential scenarios.
One of them is that we continue to try and remain naïve and continue to fumble. That's one possibility. Another possibility would be that we try to totally extract ourselves.
That's also very difficult, because supply chains are very long and very complicated, and it's very difficult to replace the Chinese component of supply chains elsewhere. And at least it's very difficult to return some of these steps in the supply chain to the US, because we've, in my opinion, foolishly, over the decades, outsourced to the extent that we've forgotten how. I read an interesting article a few years ago in the New York Times.
Somebody realized that we don't know how to make a flannel shirt anymore. And this person decided that he would attempt to recapture the art of making flannel shirts. And it took him a long, long time and acknowledged in the end that he still wasn't able to accomplish it, to the extent that he would have to if he were going to outpace the countries that are now providing us with flannel shirts.
That's a pretty simple example, but I think we have that experience across the board right now. So that's another option. The final option is to buck up, understand the Chinese approach, and do what we can to advance our cause in combination with our Chinese business partners.
That's tough slugging, it's hard work, it's not easy, but I think it's really the only viable alternative if we want to have a future.
Ken, I'm going to put forward a thesis, and I'm hoping you can tell me where you agree and tell me where you disagree, because you have much more experience than I do in this realm. So to me, I feel that a decoupling between the US and China would be unnecessarily painful for the US. It would be inflationary, it would be against our economic interest, and actually figuring out a way to play nice, for lack of a better term, with the Chinese is the best course of action for the US both economically and geopolitically.
All for nearshoring, onshoring, diversifying supply chains. But I have to think that peace between the US and China in terms of trade and in terms of geopolitics is best for both sides. What are your thoughts?
I agree. Of course, I agree. I'd be a fool to want military confrontation or to think that we can live on two different planets because for better or for worse, there is only one that we're capable of living on at the moment.
But I think that we have to… I wouldn't call it playing nice. I think that that is not to pick on your wording, but I think that's what we always try to do.
And it doesn't really work. I think it's playing clever and it's playing tough. And that's what the CCP will respect.
And it's the only way that we can make progress without being played. Because most companies, Western companies that go to China are being played. Whether they realize it or not, in my book, there are two kinds of Western companies in China, the ones that realize they're being played and the ones that haven't figured it out yet.
And they all have the same curve. In some cases, the curve is longer, because it takes longer for the Chinese side to appropriate whatever it is that they want out of the relationship. And in some cases, it's shorter, because they can figure it out fast.
And so that's the… It requires a whole different approach, a whole different way of thinking, and it's not going to be easy. But it's the best solution.
So Ken, we're recording this right before the US presidential election, and there's been a lot of talk in this election cycle about tariffs specifically targeted at China. Would you care to comment on the wisdom or the folly of such policies?
Well, I'm not against tariffs and in an across-the-board sense. Because we… Let's take the auto industry.
We have an auto industry here that admittedly, it's nowhere near as vibrant as it was 30 years ago. But it still is a vital part of our economy. And I think without tariffs, we'll be overwhelmed by electric vehicles.
And because China can now produce electric vehicles that are, you know, from the average consumer's point of view, every bit as good as Elon Musk's electric vehicles, and probably cost about one third what his cost. So it's, if we don't have some tariffs, we're not going to, it's going to result in our economic demise, I believe. On the other hand, I do think that we've got to figure out other means of dealing with this reality than just tariffs alone.
And I don't have an answer for you, but of course, that's not my job, I'm a banker. But somebody's got to figure this out, or it's just going to be downhill from here, I think.
I think that's a valuable perspective. And I think it's fair to say that even if I don't have the answer, someone must or someone needs to figure it out, identifying the problem is the first step to getting to a solution. So I did want to ask you, Ken, you mentioned a couple of minutes ago, there are two types of Western companies in China, those who are being played and those who don't yet know they're being played.
So can you talk to us about how they're being played? What are some of the common pitfalls that Western companies encounter when entering the Chinese market?
Right. I can explain that pretty quickly, and that's actually what my book is all about. It's my book, in a sense, could be renamed The Playbook, because it describes the playbook.
The playbook is the same, regardless of which companies we're talking about. From the Chinese point of view is what I'm saying, the playbook, but it works itself out, and manifests itself in different ways, because all companies are different, and all industries are different. But the playbook looks like this.
The first step in the playbook is you're wandering around China trying to find a sponsor, because you want to do business in China. And finally, you find somebody who is in a government position and takes an interest. And if they feel that what you have is useful to China, you'll get introduced to a higher level official.
In my case, it was the party secretary of Shanghai, which is, you know, is a city province. So it's a very powerful position. And his approach was, Ken, we have scoured the universe, and we've identified your bank as being the one that's most important to China.
And he explicitly said, by the way, better than Goldman Sachs, better than Morgan Stanley. We need you here. And by the way, Ken, you're one of the smartest Americans I've ever encountered.
So you're sitting there and you're thinking to themselves, and to yourself, this is a BS, but it does feel good. And after all, I do want to build a bank in China. So let it roll.
That's step number one. Step number two, and they come in, and the time between steps varies depending on the company and industry. But step number two is more like, by the way, Ken, you know you're going to have to have a joint venture partner.
It's for your sake. It's not for our sake. But we will equip you with a joint venture partner because it'll help you make progress.
China is different and you need a guide. The third step is likely to be, by the way, they've already identified the joint venture partner. The marriage will take place in the very near future unless you bolt.
But if you bolt, you don't make progress. So the third step is we are so happy. We're at the point when we're about to give you the license.
By the way, every business activity in China requires a license, and most of them require a multitude of licenses. Our banking license, which was finally granted to us after a couple of years of negotiation, only entitled us to call ourselves a bank. We needed fully about 20 different licenses to do banking business because you need a different license for each discrete activity.
So that step in the process looks like this. We're so happy we can now give you your license. But unfortunately, there are strings attached.
In our case, it was you won't be allowed to use Rem and B, Chinese currency, for three years. Because we have this old law in the box. We were so sorry we have it.
We wish we could get rid of it. But the law says, any new bank with any foreign ownership can't use Rem and B for the first three years. That's like saying, here's a license to open a restaurant, but you can't use food for the first three years.
That's fundamentally what it was. So it kind of get you over there, but then tie you up and not. So you have a multiplicity of limitations.
And then for the three year period, we were constantly being barraged with requests to share our business model. Teach other banks our business model. By the way, we'll give you a little subsidy to make sure that you're not losing too much money during this three year period during which you can't do business.
Just enough to keep you here. We strongly encourage you to help other banks understand how you do what you do. And the final step in the process, at the end of three years, there's the big day, and they're so happy to help you.
So happy to be able to leave you of the prohibition on the use of RMB. But they have one more request, and that is we so admire your business model that we decided to open our own bank next week using your business model. And would you mind spending some time with the management team, helping them understand some of the things that they still don't understand after three years of watching you and talking with you?
And that is the god-awful truth. I'm not making it up.
So Ken, to summarize, three years of delay to buy them time to borrow from your business model and set up a local or national competitor, is that an accurate summation of what you've just shared?
And in the cases where they're successful, like the auto industry, it's what you just said, plus once where they reach the point where they can do it themselves, competing against you in China, which is their right, but then subsequent to that, competing against you globally. So you can lose, you may be globally dominant at the beginning of the process, and 20 years later, find yourself globally in third or fourth position. And I would say that they justify it by the strongly held belief that China was the dominant country on Earth for 2,000 years, and that that all ended when the Brits initiated the Opium Wars.
And at this point, they don't know the difference between the Brits and the Americans. History gets muddled, they start thinking it was the Americans who did it. And the 150 years of humiliation justify whatever method they use.
And it's not really an illegal method. It flies in the face of some of the agreements pursuant to their admission to the WTO. But it's not blatantly illegal.
But if you go over there with a win-win attitude, you'll get mowed down without knowing it.
So, Ken, with all that being said, is it still viable for Western companies to pursue joint ventures in China, or has the landscape just changed too much?
Well, I'm somewhere in between on that one. Again, going back to what we said a few minutes ago, I think if you're unusually well-disciplined, unusually well-informed, unusually not naïve, but realistic and tough, that you can accomplish something. But you've got to be all those things.
And that's not easy, I think.
Ken, so that's why you wrote your book. How is it really written for the business person, the executive looking to business in China? Was it written for the political class who's engaging with China?
Who was the book written for? And can you talk to us about some of the lessons that you learned from your missteps that are included in the book?
Well, I would say that the target market for this book is in a very narrow sense, anybody who's considering doing business in China. But more importantly, anybody who fancies themselves as a citizen. Because democracy only works if you have informed citizens.
And this is directed at those who wish to be informed. And it's not written in an academic style. It's written in a style that would, I believe, I certainly hope, appeal to intelligent people in any walk of life.
So that's the… I describe a multiplicity of errors that I made. And I freely admit to having been, for want of a better term, you could call it naïve.
You know, if you were not so sensitive, you might call it stupid.
So Ken, as we wrap our conversation up, I'd love to just look forward for a minute. You've had extensive leadership experience throughout your career, both in the banking sector and outside of the sector. Can you talk to us about your views on global entrepreneurship and innovation?
What do you see happening in this space moving forward, and are you optimistic about what's happening there?
Yes, I am optimistic about it. You know, our basic business model, when Silicon Valley Bank got started, it had what it called the three-legged stool business model. We were going to be one-third small business, one-third real estate developers, and one-third technology.
When I became CEO in 2001, I worked very hard, and I accomplished it, to change the business model, because every bank in the US deals with small business and with real estate developers. We had no value add in those arenas, but we were one of the only banks in the country, or for that matter, anywhere, who focused on venture-backed technology companies. And we developed a way of doing that that worked very, very well.
And by the way, you didn't ask, but that's not what brought the bank down. It was a totally different bad decision made by CFO and not countered by others. So that was, that's the deal.
But our business model was, during my era, was to work with technology companies and help them make, become successful. And the only thing that we did outside of technology, by the way, was we were, which represented only about less than 1% of our overall business was we funded wineries. Actually, at one point, we funded more wineries than any bank in the country.
And I used to like to say that our business was rock solid because what we were funding was in the main innovation. And at the margin, wine consumption. And that those are so basic to human nature that you can't possibly lose.
And innovation is basic to human nature. We see it everywhere, in every, literally every country on earth. As they develop, they become more and more interested in technological innovation.
Prior to that, they're interested in innovation in a very general sense. That's what humans do. They innovate.
And so, yeah, I'm very optimistic about the future. I, you know, of course, reasonable people will worry about things like AI. And I think we would be silly if we didn't, but I think the probability that AI will be of great benefit to the human race is very, very high.
So I would quote unquote bank on it.
I love that. Ken, as we wrap up, I wanted to just let you know we have a lot of young professionals and young people who listen to our podcast. And I'm curious if you could go back and give your 22-year-old self one piece of career advice, what would it be and why?
What would you like to share with the next generation of aspiring bankers, consultants, professionals, executives, etc.?
Well, first of all, I'm not unhappy with the way my career developed. I thought it developed well and I was very pleased. I do think that I suppose if I were to advise my own self in any single way, it would be to be maybe just a little bit bolder and to have greater faith in my own ability.
And I don't think that I'm unique in that regard. I would say that 95 percent of the people I know could benefit from that change and modest change in outlook.
Ken Wilcox is the former CEO of Silicon Valley Bank. Ken, thanks so much for joining us on Strategy Simplified today.
Thank you for having me. I appreciate it. Good luck.